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Foreword 
 
The Paul Simon Public Policy Institute is pleased to publish this paper from Dr. Stephen 
L. Wasby who is Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University at Albany-SUNY.  
Steve, who is a former Professor of Political Science at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 
is a nationally recognized expert in the field of constitutional law and judicial processes.  In this 
paper he surveys the various plans for selecting judges utilized by the fifty states.  These plans 
break down broadly into elective versus appointive systems with those who use elections further 
distinguished by partisan versus non-partisan elections.  The most popular plan is the Merit 
Selection or “Missouri Plan” which originated in our neighboring state.  This plan has received 
much attention lately and it is the one most directly addressed in Wasby’s paper.   
        
In Illinois we use a unique combination of the plans used in other states.  Judges in 
Illinois are first selected through partisan primaries and general elections (although many are 
initially appointed to an open seat and temporarily hold the position which they subsequently 
seek by election).  The judge who is elected in a partisan contest then must later seek retention to 
the same position in a subsequent election by “running on his or her record”.  They thus do not 
face another partisan opponent in those retention contests.  The retention election is a component 
of the widely touted Merit Selection Plan which many reformers believe would be a better 
system for Illinois.  The elections for judge have become highly competitive and highly 
polarized along partisan lines in Illinois.  Perhaps the most famous example, and one which has 
garnered national attention, was the hard found and deeply divisive 2004 contest between 
Republican Lloyd A. Karmeier and Democrat Gordon E. Maag to represent the fifth judicial 
district on the Illinois Supreme Court.  This race, which Justice Karmeier ultimately won, 
consumed almost $10 million in campaign donations.  The fact that many of these donations, on 
both sides, came from individuals and interest groups likely to have business before the court, 
drew much criticism and increased the public’s already jaundiced view of how politics is done in 
the Prairie State. It also increased interest among many reformers in changing the system, 
perhaps to a merit plan. 
        
Professor Wasby discusses the challenges of having judges compete in elections versus 
having them appointed to office, which usually means appointment by the governor and a merit 
selection commission.  The laudable objectives of democratic accountability and judicial 
independence are counterpoised against each other.  It is hard to achieve one without giving up 
something on the other objective.  This dilemma is embedded in any selection system a state may 
adopt.  Unfortunately there is no single system which clearly optimizes the best mixture of these 
two highly desirable objectives as Wasby explains. 
        
This paper is offered by the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute as a part of our continuing 
series formerly called, “The Occasional Papers”, which are written by academics who are experts 
in their fields.  These authors try to glean from the academic knowledge base in their disciplines 
information which is relevant to the public policy debates taking place in the state and nation.  
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The Wasby paper is the first one under our new series title, The Simon Review. It is one which 
we think Paul Simon would have been proud to present. 
 
       John S. Jackson 
       Series Editor 
       November 2009                                                             
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“Selecting Judges: Merit Selection and Other Matters”* 
 
Stephen L. Wasby** 
 
It has been suggested that a public policy topic that is timely and needs to be addressed is 
the selection of state judges. The timeliness is clear, given controversy in Illinois about the 
amount of money spent in a recent judicial election and the U.S. Supreme Court’s response to a 
comparable situation in West Virginia. However, the matter of selecting judges and issues 
related to that topic is not limited to those two states but extends not only to other states which 
elect judges, particularly of their high courts, but to states which have, perhaps without much 
thought, adopted the so-called “merit system” of judicial selection.  
  After some further introductory comments, various means of selecting judges will be 
delineated to provide context. Then some broad questions will be raised although complete 
answers to them will not be provided. The focus will turn to aspects of selection by the “merit 
system,” which has attracted particular attention in Illinois, as elsewhere, as a possible 
replacement for election of judges.  Basically, the merit involves having a selection commission 
– composed of lawyers and sometimes laypersons, appointed by the governor and the bar, and 
serving for staggered terms– compose a list of possible appointees; the governor must appoint  
from that list; and, after the appointee has served for a designated period of time, usually at least  
________ 
*Adapted from presentation at the Southern Illinois University School of Law, under the 
auspices of the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute, October 26 2009. Thanks to Ellen Snipes for 
her fine editorial hand. 
 
** B.A., Antioch College; M.A., Ph.D. (political science), University of Oregon. Professor 
emeritus of political science, University at Albany - SUNY. Former professor of political 
science, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.  
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a year, that judge stands for retention (“Shall Judge X be retained in office?”) 
 Perhaps because of long work  on the federal judicial system, where judges are appointed, 
my bias has been toward methods of selection that involve appointment. However, I am also a 
skeptic and a contrarian, and it is in the spirit of the Simon Institute that questions should be 
raised about what too many people too readily accept as a preferred reform.   
I.     Unless we want to be people with an answer seeking a question, we must specify the 
perceived problem. It is the election of state judges and, more particularly, increased contests in 
such elections, based on decisions that sitting judges have made, with large amounts of money 
being spent and with that money thought to play a substantial role in decisions. Here it should be 
pointed out that increased attention and money has been given to state high courts, with both trial 
courts and the largely invisible state intermediate appellate courts less of an issue. It should also 
be noted that most states have adopted intermediate appellate courts, which, with mandatory 
jurisdiction, resolve the appeals in routine cases, so that state high courts then become more like 
the U.S. Supreme Court in being “certiorari” (discretionary jurisdiction) courts, able to select the 
cases they think most important, in addition to being the place to which election contests and 
death penalty cases are automatically sent. 
            Increased contests for high judicial office are said to have produced a money race and to 
have increased the influence of money or certainly its potential influence.  The facts underlying 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Capperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009),  can 
be treated as the basic poster for the situation. A $50 million judgment was awarded by a West 
Virginia state trial court against Massey Coal for fraudulent misrepresentation and tortious 
interference with contractual relations. With elections to the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
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Appeals in the offing, Massey’s chair/president/CEO supported Brent Benjamin for a position on 
the court, in opposition to incumbent Justice McGraw, and Massey contributed not only the 
$1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin’s campaign committee –peanuts, and hardly worth our 
attention– but also $500K in “independent expenditures” (for direct mailings and media 
advertising) and $2.5M to a Section 527 political organization which opposed McGraw and 
supported Benjamin. The Massey contributions were two-thirds of the organization’s funds and 
the $3M dwarfed other amounts contributed by Benjamin’s supporters and Benjamin’s own 
committee. It may be no surprise, then, that, aided by some missteps by incumbent Justice 
McGraw, Benjamin won (by 53.3%-46.7%). Or that new Justice Benjamin was in the 3-2 
majority that reversed the verdict against Massey. Or that Justice Benjamin refused to recuse 
(withdraw from the case), and with two of the other justices recused, Benjamin, as acting chief 
justice, chose two replacement judges, and that on rehearing the result was the same. 
 Faced with this situation, the U.S. Supreme Court granted review –remember, the justices 
of our nation’s highest court decide only about seventy cases a year out of 8,000 petitions for 
review– and reversed. But they did so by a vote of only 5-4, with Justice Kennedy writing for the 
Court and Chief Justice Roberts along with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissenting.  Using 
so-called “objective” standards (meaning how matters would look to a neutral observer), the 
majority found that “there was here a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice 
Benjamin’s recusal.” (Id., at 2265) What Justice Kennedy’s opinion means continues to be a 
subject of some debate. It was hedged about by references to “an extraordinary situation” and 
“extreme cases,” and the Chief Justice’s dissent was a combination of complaints about the lack 
of guidelines about when recusal would be required and a litany of questions the majority had 
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left unanswered. (One quick response to that point is that after handing down a ruling in a “lead” 
case, the Court often waits for later cases to be brought to flesh out the meaning of the  “lead” 
case.)  
 Perhaps money does make a difference, perhaps it does not; certainly the justices of the 
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed as to that empirical matter in the West Virginia race.  While now 
receiving more attention, the linkage between contributions to judicial campaigns and judges’ 
votes in cases has not been persuasively established.  Perhaps some players –whether they be 
insurance or trial lawyers– are trying to buy elections because cases important to them will be on 
the docket. But perhaps contributions are made because donors –including lawyers– are 
committed to retaining judicial competence: Lest you scoff, sometimes a cigar is just a cigar, and 
lawyers who practice before the courts want competent, fair judges because they know someone 
who will tilt toward them in one case may well tilt unfairly toward an opponent in another.  And 
perhaps money simply follows the donors’ inclinations rather than causing judges to vote a 
certain way. After all, it is basic social science that a correlation (in this instance, between 
contributions and votes) is not causation. 
 One should add that, with the linkage between money and votes not resolved for the 
legislature, it is difficult to resolve it for judicial elections, where the issue is more recent. And 
here one would have to ask whether buying a legislative vote, if that is what a contribution to a 
legislative candidate does, is “less bad” than buying a judicial vote? We seem to think so, but 
vague sentiments aren’t enough to resolve important public policy issues. In addition, we have 
not managed to stop campaign contributions to legislators, as each new campaign finance 
“reform” seems to have more loopholes and places through which to drive Mack trucks, so one is 
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faced with comparable difficulties in making arguments about stopping them for judges.  If one 
asks whether the perceived problem can be resolved either by limiting campaign contributions or 
by providing public funding of such campaigns, the answer is “probably no better than with 
executive and legislative races.”  
 And, as the U.S. Supreme Court required recusal in Capperton v. Massey, one might ask 
whether one can resolve the matter by leaving judicial elections and campaign finances in place 
but requiring recusal. The problem here is that judges are those who decide on their own recusal, 
at least  in the first instance, doing so if they search their own consciences, and then if lawyers 
request them to do so, which is a risky matter for lawyers who must appear there again. If they 
decline to recuse and continue to sit on a case, the parties must wait for completion of the case 
and must lose it to use judicial bias as the basis for an appeal. (Requests for mandamus to a 
higher court to force out a judge are disfavored as disrupting trials.) And if it is a judge of a state 
high court whose participation is at issue, as it was in West Virginia, the only further appeal in 
the judicial system is to the U.S. Supreme Court, which will take only exceptional cases – like 
the West Virginia situation.  
 As to whether recusal would suffice to cure the problem, we must recognize that judicial 
arrogance is indeed an important part of the problem. Many judges routinely recuse after 
checking lists of parties and attorneys before them, and we hear nothing about it because they 
aren’t required to state reasons. However, some judges –including Justice Scalia, who took his 
lead from the late Chief Justice Rehnquist– don’t understand that people do see the appearance 
of impropriety and that the judges’ continuing to sit doesn’t pass the “sour taste test.” In short, 
relying on the judicial system to police itself is a chancy proposition. Capperton v. Massey is 
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instructive. After the West Virginia high court’s initial ruling, recusal of three justices was 
sought on rehearing, with pictures surfacing of one justice (not the Massey-supported Benjamin) 
having vacationed with a member of the court. That justice –who, surprise, surprise, had 
supported Massey–did recuse, as did a justice on the other side who had criticized Justice 
Benjamin’s position. But remember that Justice Benjamin, the electoral beneficiary of all the 
money, did not recuse.    
II.  After this discussion of a perceived problem, a delineation of the means of judicial 
selection is in order.  In the federal system, Supreme Court justices and U.S. court of appeals and 
district court judges are appointed – nominated by the president and confirmed (eventually, in 
almost all cases) by the Senate. Just less than a quarter of the states (12) use direct appointment, 
although some of those require confirmation by the Senate or a body like a governor’s council. 
The appointive states are, except for Hawaii, all in the East (mostly in the Northeast).  Some 
states once used legislative election of judges, but in at least one of those states (Rhode Island), 
some of those justices who had themselves been legislators kept acting in a legislative fashion 
while on the court and ended up in ethical difficulty – which led to altering the selection plan. Of 
the remaining states, half elect their judges and half use the merit system, at least for the state’s 
highest court.  Of the twenty-two using election, in fifteen the judicial elections are nonpartisan, 
while they are partisan in seven. A number of states use different methods of selection for the 
state high court and for the lower courts; for example, judges of  New York’s Court of Appeals 
(the high court) are chosen by the merit system, while those on that state’s trial court of general 
jurisdiction (oddly, named the Supreme Court) are elected.  And in Missouri, where the merit 
system started, it initially was used only for the state supreme court and for the trial courts in St. 
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Louis and in Jackson County (Kansas City). 
III.  In a consideration of judicial selection,  some large questions should be asked. The 
first is, “How much democracy do we want in judicial selection?” A somewhat different way of 
putting the matter is to ask, “Do you want selection of judges to be like, or different from, the 
selection of legislators?” Another, and related, question is “Where do you want the politics in 
judicial selection?”   Because all support not only motherhood and apple pie but also support 
“judicial independence,” another question that must be answered is,  “How do we best achieve 
judicial independence?”  And still another question, to be taken into account in developing 
selection systems, is “Should the judiciary be representative of the population?” 
 On the last of these, the argument is usually that “diversity” of the judiciary increases the 
judiciary’s legitimacy, because a racially and gender diverse bench leads women and racial or 
ethnic minorities not to believe “someone else” is making decisions affecting them. In the federal 
system, Presidents Carter and Clinton focused on diversity –more than on ideology (particularly 
true for Clinton)– and the Presidents Bush did a better job than their Republican predecessors in 
that regard, at least as to women. There has, however, been little attention to this matter at the 
state level, although the number of female judges has increased and there have been some 
instances of majority-female state high courts, including Minnesota as the first, four women, two 
white males, and Alan Page, the former pro football player. One might ask the extent to which a 
selection method produces diversity. Diversity is not inconsistent with merit – any more than 
patronage and merit are necessarily inconsistent: If there are two equally meritorious candidates 
for a position, selecting from one’s own party isn’t all bad.   
 Judicial independence is not my focus here, but some matters might be mentioned briefly.  
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By judicial independence is generally meant a situation that makes it possible for judges to be 
fair and impartial in the individual case–that is, decisions free of bias and a lack of untoward 
pressure on judges– and a lack of executive and legislative interference in the judiciary’s work, 
which means relative autonomy for the judiciary in development of its budget and provisions 
against reduction in judicial salary while in office. How to mesh modes of selection with judicial 
independence is a difficult matter and that almost all who advocate particular modes of selection 
tout them as aiding judicial independence. This happens even in the Canadian model, in which 
the Prime Minister announces the decision out of the blue, as if politics haven’t affected the 
decision. Some advocates do, however, stress judicial accountability over independence.  
  As to each of the other questions: 
 (1) From time to time, we hear support for popular accountability of judges, particularly 
through election; this is, we are told, “the democratic way.”  Yet we have regularly acted to limit 
the amount of democratic action.  In formally elective systems, we find that judges leave the 
court before the end of their term, with their positions filled by appointment, so that the next 
election features an incumbent. This gaming of the system has been widespread. In one state, for 
example, no judge reached the state’s high court by its nonpartisan election mechanism for over 
twenty years, and that string was broken only because some judge had to serve his whole term to 
vest his pension. In that same state, judges who would reach mandatory retirement several 
months after the beginning of a new term would nonetheless run for reelection and be endorsed 
by the bar and the newspapers, an indication of what might call elite “connivance,” only to retire 
shortly after being reelected, with the governor choosing their successors. In other situations, we 
would call that a “fraud upon the public.” We also find that when there is a formal election 
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system, parties may cross-endorse each other’s candidates, leaving elections non-competitive. 
Or, believing that “politics” should be removed from judicial elections, we make judicial 
elections non-partisan, so that, with the party cue removed, electoral turnout is reduced, and it is 
reduced further when judicial elections are not held at the time of the biennial general election.   
I would add that non-elective systems can also be undercut, as when, in the selection of federal 
judges, which requires the Senate’s advice and consent, a president makes a recess appointment 
to the judiciary, thus thwarting the participation of publicly-elected officials. 
 (2) Political scientists Chris Bonneau and Melinda Gann have recently argued, in In 
Defense of Judicial Elections (Routledge, 2009) that elections are valid means of selecting 
judges because judges are like any other government officials in the way they behave. (A 
contrary and well-stated different  view, by Gerald Leonard,  is that “Political as judging must 
often or always be, there is something distinctive and meaningful about the activities of judges 
relative to those of legislators and executive officers . .. “)  Bonneau and Hall do a good job of 
debunking reformers’ pretensions. For example, they argue effectively that reforms may produce 
exactly that about which the reformers complain – for example, nonpartisan elections produce 
low turnout and higher campaign expenses because the candidates are not known. However, their 
case for judicial elections is not as strong.  Indeed, there has been an increase in contested 
elections, particularly for open seats (those with no incumbent), and there has also been the same 
dynamic as in legislative elections, with vigorous contestation of open seats and where 
incumbents perhaps vulnerable because of an unpopular decision attract challengers and an 
incumbent must lock up the money to preclude challenges, although, again as with legislative 
elections, incumbents receive more contributions.  A problem with Bonneau and Hall’s argument 
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is that their focus is almost entirely on selection to state high courts and on high-profile/hot-
button cases. It is indeed with such cases that, just as at the U.S. Supreme Court, with vague 
constitutional provisions to be interpreted and imprecise precedents to be applied, we are most 
likely to see the effects of ideology on judges’ decisions. If instead we look at state intermediate 
appellate courts –like the Illinois Court of Appeals– to which most appeals go and at which most 
conclude, we find little disagreement and (thus) less effect of ideology. Yet if we are to talk 
about the effect of the method of selecting judges, we should be concerned about all levels of 
courts, not just state high courts. 
IV.  After this extended prologue, it is time to turn more directly to an examination of the 
realities of the merit system. The largest problem, in my view, is that it is oversold. It may be an 
improvement, in some respects, over relevant aspects of judicial election, but it is not a “silver 
bullet” – certainly not the one that some advocates seem to make it out to be.  What are some of 
the problems? 
$  We are told that the public gets to play a role. But how? In retention elections. But they 
don’t come until after a person has been placed on the bench by an appointment process (the 
governor’s choice from a list prepared by others, who are selected in a low-visibility manner) 
and the judge has served for some designated period of time. And then the judge runs unopposed 
without even the aid of a partisan label, which does aid voters. Even when a super-majority 
(often 60 percent) is required for retention, few judges are ever removed. So to speak of the 
“merit” system as democratic comes close to being a farce, and it somewhat puzzling that groups 
like the League of Women Voters support it, as they are supporting a selection method which 
limits, not encourages, voter participation.  
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In short, the merit system may have redeeming features, but public participation is not 
one of them.  
$ The merit system seems to be the “pet project” of community elites, including newspaper 
editors and lawyers’ bar associations.  Certainly groups try to have privileged status in any 
selection process, and one can see this when  bar associations get to select members of the 
judicial nominating commissions, just as one can see it in federal appointment of judges, where 
the American Bar Association long had the privileged position of getting to see and “vet” 
potential nominees. 
$ Politics are there, behind the scenes. Those politics play out in terms of who vets the 
nominees; and if there is a screening/nominating commission, groups bring their pressure there, 
again out of sight. There is the substitution of bar politics –a continuing of the dispute between 
“trial lawyer” (personal injury lawyers) and insurance defense lawyers– for partisan politics. But 
partisan politics can still intervene.  In Missouri, where the merit system started –indeed, it was 
long known as the “Missouri Plan”– the selection commission, which had to provide the 
governor with three names, would select one nominee from the “off” party (i.e., a Republican if 
there were a Democrat governor), one person from the governor’s party but from another faction 
of that party, and only one that the governor was likely to select. Who made the selection? In 
reality, the commission did, not the governor. The leading study of the “Missouri plan” –The 
Politics of the Bench and Bar, by Richard Watson, Ronald Downing, and Frederick Spiegel 
(1969), has long been ignored despite what it tells us about the actual operation of the system.  
$ Lists provided to the governor often exclude important segments of the community, such  
as women, African-Americans, Hispanics, or ethnic groups like Italian-Americans. If the list is 
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only advisory, the governor can “cure” the defect, but in the standard merit system, the governor 
must select from the list. The governor could reject it and ask for another, but the selection 
commission can stand pat, and most do. 
$ One gets the substitution of bar politics for other types of politics, as noted above. 
Politics will not go away because one takes political parties out of the picture. Even the “best” 
judicial selection commission can’t avoid politics. See this statement, made in the context of a 
discussion about the South African Judicial Selection Commission: “The involvement of a 
judicial selection commission, even one which…has a membership carefully designed to 
represent the interest of different groups and follows a transparent procedure, does not eliminate 
controversy and suspicions that professional accomplishment plays second fiddle to political 
interests.” 
 As this discussion may suggest, the debate over the balance of political and legal (merit) 
factors is unending.  
V. There is one other matter that should be noted, because it bears on any discussion as to 
whether judicial elections should be continued or replaced with some other method of selection.  
That is the movement, in the name of freedom of speech, to remove limits on what candidates for 
judicial office may say when seeking office or retention in office.  This certainly bears on the 
question of judicial independence, because a judge who promises to adopt a particular stance is 
likely to be less independent than one who does not – although we must keep in mind that, as the 
charade known as the Sotomayor hearings indicates, as did the Roberts and Alito hearings before 
them, that statements about “only deciding based on the law” not only fly in the face of strong 
social science evidence to the contrary, particularly in discretionary jurisdiction highest courts, 
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but also are falsehoods perpetrated –and perpetuated– in the effort to achieve confirmation.  
 One of the most important developments with respect to judicial elections, and indeed a 
major development in First Amendment law, is the use of the doctrine of freedom of speech to 
attack restrictions, embodied in codes of judicial conduct and ethics, on what candidates for 
judicial office may say, such as those provisions prohibiting judicial candidates from 
“announcing views on disputed legal or political issues.” Although the U.S. Supreme Court has 
not reached the related provisions precluding judicial promises as to decisions, a majority of the 
Court, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), did strike down judicial 
conduct provisions prohibiting a judge or judicial candidate announcing positions on policy 
issues. The attack on these provisions has continued and expanded after White and has led to 
considerable litigation, with cases argued most notably by James Bopp, a leading conservative 
public interest litigator. With the “announce clause” invalidated, the next provisions to be 
attacked are those which prevent judges from making pledges, promises, or commitments, and 
litigation concerning those provisions occurs most frequently in the context of interest groups 
wanting judicial candidates to complete questionnaires. There have been a number of post-White 
rulings, such as those in which courts have struck down bans on judges’ soliciting campaign 
contributions – and saying that requiring that they do so through a committee doesn’t resolve the 
problem of judges knowing the identity of contributors. 
 * * * * * 
Concluding Thoughts.  As the purpose of this paper has been to inform, I do not offer much of a 
conclusion, much less a grand one. The information provided is, without question, informed by a 
skepticism about the claims of those who would substitute the “merit system,” as it has come to 
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be known, for elections. I hold no brief for judicial elections. Perhaps what I’ve heard about 
them for many years, their “down-side,” has affected me –media coverage, which is not 
favorable to elections, may well have affected me. But it is one thing to be “not thrilled” by one 
mechanism for selecting judges, and another to fall fully into the arms of an alternative means. 
Perhaps it’s just that I am a contrarian.  I hope the questions raised here –the big ones  noted at 
the beginning of my talk, and the “smaller” ones about particular selection systems– have piqued 
the reader’s  interest and stimulated thought. 
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I call to your attention an extremely fine article by political scientist, G. Alan Tarr, "Do Retention 
Elections Work?" It appears at 74 Missouri Law Review 605-633 (Summer 2009).Tarr raises 
serious questions about assertions made by those who support retention elections, a crucial part
of the "merit system" of judicial selection.  SLW 
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